For almost three years, the international effort to rein in the commercial spyware and hacking-for-hire market has mostly told governments how to behave. On Nov. 11, the United Kingdom and France turned to the companies themselves.
At the third Pall Mall Process conference in Paris, the two countries launched the Pall Mall Process Guidelines for Industry. It is a voluntary standard for companies that develop, sell or finance what the guidelines call "commercial cyber intrusion capabilities": spyware, exploit tooling and the services that go with them. The UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office published the guidelines the same day.
Not many governments signed it. According to The Record, 14 governments adopted the guidelines out of 43 countries at the conference, so fewer than half. The signatories include the UK, France, the United States, Germany, Italy and Japan.
What the Pall Mall Process Is
The UK and France started the Pall Mall Process in February 2024 with the Pall Mall Declaration. The declaration is non-binding and rests on four pillars, according to the FCDO: accountability, precision, oversight and transparency. The idea is that states and the companies that supply them should use intrusion tools only in narrow, supervised and defensible ways.
The process produced a Code of Practice for States, launched in 2025. The Record reports that 27 countries have signed it, almost twice as many as the 14 that adopted the new industry guidelines on their first day.
What the Guidelines Ask Vendors to Do
The Record and Tech Times describe the same core expectations. (ZeroDayFeed did not review the guidelines document itself. The FCDO publishes it as an ODT attachment.) Companies that build, sell or bankroll intrusion capabilities are asked to:
- Know their customer. Vet buyers before selling to them.
- Build in safeguards. Put technical controls into products to limit misuse.
- Watch and report. Keep systems in place to monitor how tools are used and to report abuse.
- Know when to stop. Halt sales and support when serious misuse is a credible risk.
- Think about victims. "Consider" remedies for victims of human rights abuses.
That list follows Tech Times' summary. The wording on victims is soft. Vendors are asked to consider remedies, not to provide them.
No Teeth, by Design
The guidelines are non-binding and carry no penalties. Governments endorsed them. Industry bodies did not, The Record reports, so no vendor is formally committed to anything.
France's ministry still described the document as the "first global standard of responsible conduct" for the sector and argued that it matters: "A voluntary code is not, however, an optional code."
Because there are no penalties, The Record and Tech Times say enforcement pressure is expected to come from the governments that buy these tools and license their export. In principle, a signatory state could buy only from vendors that follow the guidelines, or weigh the guidelines when deciding whether to license an export. If major government customers did that, the code would work something like a procurement standard instead of a law. That is an inference, not something the guidelines require. The test is whether signatories actually turn down non-compliant suppliers.
Tech Times also notes that the UK-French consultation behind the process questioned how much technical safeguards can do. Respondents proposed measures such as kill switches and usage logs, but said a sold exploit cannot be revoked and that vendors have limited ability to investigate or force sovereign customers to act.
The Missing 29
The weakest point is the signature count. Of the 43 countries at the Paris conference, 29 did not endorse the industry guidelines on launch day. The Record says it is not clear why the remaining 15 signatories of the 2025 states' code did not endorse the new guidelines, and none of the sources give reasons for the other non-endorsers either.
This matters for a procurement-based approach. If enforcement depends on buyer governments refusing to deal with irresponsible vendors, every non-signatory is a market the code cannot reach.
What It Means for Defenders
There is nothing to patch here. This is a policy development, not a vulnerability disclosure, and the sources give no technical indicators, fixed versions or mitigations. Some points are still worth knowing:
- The threat model has not changed. The guidelines are voluntary, have no penalties and have 14 government signatories. Commercial intrusion tools stay on the market. Journalists, executives, government staff, lawyers, activists and the IT teams that support them should keep treating mercenary spyware as a live risk. A code of conduct should not be a reason to relax mobile and endpoint hardening.
- Watch procurement and export rules. The Record and Tech Times report that enforcement pressure is expected to come through government purchasing and export licensing. Any practical effects would therefore be most likely to show up in government acquisition requirements and export licensing, not in vendors' marketing. Federal contractors and companies working with endorsing governments, which include the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Japan, may want to watch for the guidelines to appear in contract or licensing language.
- If you buy offensive tooling, expect due-diligence questions. Organizations that buy intrusion capabilities, or invest in firms that make them, can use the five core asks as a checklist: customer vetting, built-in safeguards, abuse monitoring and reporting, a defined point to stop sales, and a position on victim remedies. Asking vendors how they handle each one is a reasonable first step.
- Victim remedy is not guaranteed. The guidelines only ask firms to "consider" remedies for victims of human rights abuses. Organizations hit by commercial spyware should not plan on any compensation or support from the vendor.
The Paris launch shows that two major European governments, along with the US and several other allies, want the commercial hacking industry held to a written standard. Whether that standard changes vendor behavior depends on the 14 signatories using their purchasing power, and on the other governments in the room choosing to join them.