Most of the money in this settlement depends on whether the companies follow through. On November 6, the attorneys general of New York, Connecticut, Michigan and New Jersey announced a deal with the Perry Johnson companies over the 2023 breach at Perry Johnson & Associates (PJ&A), which exposed medical data on 13.3 million people. The companies pay at least $300,000 in penalties now. Another $9.7 million comes due if they fail to meet the settlement's terms, which require a set of security reforms.

The headline figure, "up to $10 million," is the total if the companies fall short. The practical lessons sit in the AGs' account of how the intrusion happened. It is a familiar chain: one stolen credential, no second factor on remote access, unencrypted sensitive files, and monitoring software that recorded the attack but never told anyone.

Who settled, and with whom

According to the New York Attorney General's office, the settlement covers Perry Johnson & Associates, Perry Johnson Inc., PJ&A Coding, PJ&A Radiology, and Medical Transcription and Coding. The Record describes them as the medical transcription, coding and imaging subsidiaries of Nevada-based Perry Johnson Companies.

The four states acted as a coalition. New York says about 4.2 million of the 13.3 million affected people are New Yorkers. Connecticut's Attorney General puts the state's count at approximately 107,960 residents.

The money, broken down

  • Paid now: at least $300,000 in penalties across the coalition.
  • Contingent: an additional $9,700,000 if the companies do not meet the settlement terms.
  • New York's share: at least $100,000.
  • Connecticut's share: $66,666 in penalties and costs.

Spread over 13.3 million people, the upfront $300,000 comes to roughly two cents per person. The structure tells you what regulators were after. Most of the money works like a performance bond: by the terms of the deal it is owed only if the companies fail to meet the settlement terms. That puts the weight of the deal on what the companies change, not on what they pay today.

How the breach happened, per the AGs

The New York AG's office lays out the sequence:

  • Initial access with real credentials. The attackers logged in using a PJ&A Coding employee's credentials. Remote access had no multi-factor authentication (MFA), the second check, such as an app prompt or hardware key, that blocks a login even when the password is known. One valid username and password was enough.
  • Credential harvesting and file access. Once inside, the attackers collected more passwords and reached unencrypted files containing Social Security numbers, diagnoses, lab results and medication information.
  • Logging without alerting. The companies' software logged the malicious activity but was not configured to alert security staff. The evidence existed, and no one was told about it.
  • Discovery by the attackers. The companies learned of the breach only when the hackers contacted them, two months later.

None of these steps needed a zero-day or advanced tooling. Each one is a control failure that security frameworks have warned about for years. Together they gave the intruders an open run of roughly two months.

The sources do not attribute the attack to any named group or country, and this article does not either. The Record reports that the company did not respond to a request for comment.

What the settlement requires

According to New York's announcement, the companies must put in place:

  • A formal information security program;
  • Incident response protocols, meaning a defined plan for detecting, escalating and handling an intrusion;
  • Multi-factor authentication;
  • Encryption safeguards;
  • Password and asset management safeguards;
  • Annual risk assessments consistent with HIPAA;
  • Policies on collection, use, retention and disposal of personal health information.

Each item lines up, by our reading, with a failure in the AGs' account. MFA addresses the stolen login. Encryption addresses the readable files. Incident response, which in practice means alerts that reach a person, addresses the two months of silence. Retention and disposal policies are a reasonable fit for the question of how much data was available to steal in the first place, though the AGs do not draw that link themselves.

Why this matters beyond one vendor

PJ&A, which the AGs describe as an information technology company providing coding, billing and recording services to health care organizations, handled other organizations' patient records. Breaches at back-office vendors like this hit millions of people who have never heard of the company. That helps explain the coalition approach. When one vendor holds records for residents of many states, attorneys general acting together have more leverage than any one state acting alone.

The settlement also shows where state regulators draw the line. The AGs' account describes controls that were missing or misconfigured, and the remedy is a list of those controls.

What It Means for Defenders

Who is affected: The 13.3 million people whose data was exposed, including about 4.2 million New Yorkers and about 107,960 Connecticut residents. Exposed data included Social Security numbers, diagnoses, lab results and medications, so the risks are identity fraud and medical identity fraud. People who received a notice should watch credit reports and insurer explanation-of-benefits statements for unfamiliar activity.

For any organization that handles sensitive data, including healthcare vendors, small businesses and defense contractors working toward CMMC, treat the AGs' findings as an audit checklist:

  • MFA on every remote access path. VPNs, remote desktop gateways, virtual desktops and cloud consoles. Look for exceptions such as legacy accounts, service accounts and contractor logins. In this case, per the AGs, a single employee's credentials plus no MFA on remote access was enough.
  • Logs only help if alerts reach a person. Check that your monitoring tools are set to notify someone who will act, and test it. Generate a benign test event and confirm the alert arrives. Software that "logs the activity" without alerting is the specific failure the AGs describe.
  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest. Unencrypted files holding SSNs and clinical data made the harvest easy. Find where those files sit, including file shares and exports, not just databases.
  • Limit credential sprawl. The attackers collected more passwords after getting in. Look for credentials stored in scripts, shared documents and browser password stores, and rotate any that turn up.
  • Keep less data. A retention policy that deletes records you no longer need reduces how much an intruder can take. Regulators now write this into settlements.
  • Write down and rehearse incident response. A two-month gap between intrusion and discovery is what happens when nobody owns detection. Name who receives alerts, who escalates, and who calls counsel and notifies customers.
  • Vet your vendors the same way. If a third party processes your customers' or patients' data, ask directly about MFA on remote access, encryption at rest and alerting. Their breach becomes your notification problem.

The sources do not involve a software patch or fixed version. The mitigations are the controls listed above, which are also the controls the settlement now requires.

Sources