Attackers took over at least 288 managed endpoints across 48 organizations this week. According to ConnectWise, which makes ScreenConnect, they did it without a flaw in ScreenConnect itself. The suspected route was a plugin.
Security firm Huntress reported on November 11 that intruders used Run commands on cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels to install a second, rogue ScreenConnect client on each machine, along with a toolkit Huntress calls SCKit. Huntress says the activity appears tied to a third-party ScreenConnect extension called RMM+. The machines were managed by multiple managed service providers (MSPs), the outside IT firms that look after many small and mid-sized businesses through remote management tools like ScreenConnect.
ConnectWise says it has found no evidence of a flaw in its own product or infrastructure. As a precaution it has disabled a family of extensions in about 400 partner environments. Its Trust Center advisory, last updated November 12 at 02:45 UTC, says the investigation is still open.
How it happened
ScreenConnect lets partners add extensions, which are add-ons that give the console extra features. According to ConnectWise, the extensions in the RMM+ family provide an API capable of executing remote commands. That API is meant to be protected by a passphrase the partner sets during setup.
Huntress says the problem is what happens when nobody sets that passphrase. In RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32, if an administrator never configured the access key, the extension accepts a blank one. The ScreenConnect builds involved were 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783, according to Huntress.
There is a second problem. RMM+ works outside ScreenConnect's normal user accounts, The Register reports, so multi-factor authentication on those accounts does not protect it. A partner could have MFA turned on for every technician and still be exposed through the extension.
ConnectWise's wording is more careful. It says the activity "may involve" abuse of independent third-party extensions, and that the initial access method and full scope are still being investigated. It also says it has "no evidence of a compromise of ConnectWise infrastructure or a vulnerability in ScreenConnect itself."
Ninety minutes
The campaign moved quickly. Huntress says it first saw suspicious activity at about 17:47 UTC on November 11. All 288 hosts were affected over 90 minutes, and about a third of them in the first ten minutes. The Register reports that Huntress was initially tracking six compromised MSPs.
The final count may be higher. According to The Register, Huntress suspects more MSPs were compromised, because the attackers appeared to number their victims sequentially and the numbers suggested earlier attacks it had not detected. Huntress's 288 endpoints and 48 organizations are the ones it can see, not necessarily the full total.
What SCKit does
Huntress describes SCKit as a package of 16 files. It does two jobs.
The first is persistence. SCKit installs a separate ScreenConnect client that the attackers control, so they keep remote access even if the legitimate connection is shut down. On a network where ScreenConnect traffic is normal, a second ScreenConnect client can blend in.
The second job is spreading. Huntress says SCKit sets a "relay trap" meant to intercept session cookies. A session cookie is the token that keeps a user logged in, and stealing one can let an attacker act as that user without a password. According to Huntress, the toolkit is designed to spread to the technicians who connect to infected machines, with the aim of reaching the other sessions those technicians can access. That would turn one infected client PC into a route back to the MSP and from there to other customers it manages.
So far that step has not worked. Huntress says the console-takeover attempt failed in every recovered host log it has checked so far. Those are the logs it has reviewed to date, and the behavior is the reason both companies tell technicians not to connect to suspect machines in the usual way.
What ConnectWise did
ConnectWise says about 400 partner environments have at least one extension from the RMM+ family installed. It stresses that their presence alone does not establish compromise. The five extensions it named for precautionary disabling are Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link. It disabled them wherever it can act, and told partners running their own servers to disable them.
Disabling the extensions is a containment step aimed at the suspected entry point. It does not remove anything the attackers already left behind, and on that point ConnectWise is blunt.
Cleanup is the hard part
ConnectWise warns that "disabling extensions and resetting credentials alone may not remove unauthorized software, persistence mechanisms, or access already established on endpoints." According to The Register, Huntress said some machines were reinfected within minutes of leaving isolation because the malware had not been fully removed. A rogue ScreenConnect client keeps working after the extension that installed it is gone.
This is a familiar pattern with remote-management tools. The same access that lets an MSP fix hundreds of machines at once lets an intruder infect hundreds at once, and the usual way to investigate, which is to remote in, may hand the attacker a technician session.
What It Means for Defenders
Who is affected: ScreenConnect partners, mainly MSPs, that have any extension from the RMM+ family installed, and the customers they manage. Huntress tied the activity to RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 on ScreenConnect 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783, especially where no access key was ever configured. If you are a small business or contractor whose IT is outsourced, ask your MSP directly whether it runs ScreenConnect with these extensions and whether it is affected.
What to check:
- Confirm whether Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, RMM+ Password Link or any related RMM+ family extension is installed. ConnectWise has disabled these as a precaution. Do not re-enable or reinstall them pending further guidance from ConnectWise.
- If an RMM+ extension was ever installed, find out whether its access key was set. A blank key on versions 1.0.31 or 1.0.32 is the condition Huntress describes.
- Look for extra ScreenConnect clients on managed endpoints, meaning any client that does not connect to your own instance. Huntress says SCKit installs a second, attacker-controlled client.
- Review Run Command and Toolbox history on ScreenConnect instances for commands you cannot explain, particularly around the November 11 activity.
How to respond:
- Do not triage infected hosts over ScreenConnect. Both Huntress and ConnectWise warn against it, because SCKit is built to go after technicians who connect.
- Treat any ScreenConnect connection to an unfamiliar machine as unsafe, Huntress advises.
- Do not assume that disabling extensions or rotating credentials finishes the job. Reported reinfections happened within minutes when machines left isolation with malware still present. Fully remove rogue clients and the toolkit before reconnecting a machine.
- Rotate credentials and session tokens for technician accounts anyway. Huntress's cookie-relay finding means sessions may have been targeted even though the takeover attempts it has reviewed failed.
For CMMC and federal contractors: if an MSP with privileged remote access to your environment is affected, this is an external-provider incident. Get written confirmation of your MSP's exposure and cleanup status and keep it with your incident records.
No fixed RMM+ version has been named in the sources so far. The mitigation for now is ConnectWise's disabling of the extensions plus a full cleanup of affected endpoints. ConnectWise says its investigation into the initial access method and scope continues, and we will update this story as details emerge.
Sources
- ConnectWise Trust Center: ScreenConnect security advisory: Precautionary extension disabling and partner guidance
- Huntress: SCKit Worm Installs Rogue ScreenConnect Clients and Session Cookie Relays Across Hundreds of Endpoints
- The Register: Hackers exploiting ScreenConnect plugin flaw to spread malware across hundreds of PCs