If your organization runs a phone system, PBX, contact center or SIP gateway built on FreeSWITCH, the open-source telephony engine maintained under the SignalWire project, today is the day to make sure it is patched. A critical code-injection flaw tracked as CVE-2026-116779 lets a remote party send a text message over SIP and have FreeSWITCH run its own administrative API commands. That includes commands that reach the underlying operating system.

The maintainers' own advisory states that "exploitation of this path has been observed in the wild." The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added the bug to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on Nov. 9 and gave federal civilian agencies until Nov. 12 to act. That is a three-day window.

A chat feature with a back door

SIP, the Session Initiation Protocol, is the signaling language most voice-over-IP systems use to set up calls. It also has a MESSAGE method that carries instant-message-style text between endpoints, and FreeSWITCH supports it through what it calls "chat." Inside FreeSWITCH, chat is not one thing. Several chat "protocols," or interfaces, can receive a message and decide what to do with it.

According to the GitHub security advisory GHSA-mg63-h38w-8p9p, the bug sits in the code that handles inbound SIP MESSAGE requests (the function sofia_presence_handle_sip_i_message()). The way that code reads the message's recipient field lets the sender choose which internal chat protocol handles the message. One of those protocols is api, and it passes its address to switch_api_execute(), the same function that runs administrative commands typed at the FreeSWITCH console.

Put simply, a feature meant to deliver text to a user can be pointed at the switch's control interface. The advisory notes a second dangerous path as well: where mod_lua is loaded, as the stock configuration does, inline Lua scripts can be reached the same way.

Why the default setup is exposed

Many critical bugs are softened by the fact that the vulnerable feature is off by default. This one is not. The advisory says:

  • Chat is on unless you turn it off. It stays enabled unless a SIP profile explicitly sets enable-chat=false, and the stock internal and external profiles leave it on.
  • The inbound ACL does not help. FreeSWITCH's inbound access-control list, which many admins rely on to fence off who can talk to the switch, does not cover MESSAGE requests.
  • Authentication is a low bar. Where authentication of MESSAGE requests is enforced, any single valid account is enough. Installs still carrying the sample directory file conf/vanilla/directory/default/default.xml define a user named default with no password.

That last point matters because FreeSWITCH deployments are often built by copying the vanilla sample configuration and modifying it. A forgotten sample user can quietly turn an "authenticated only" bug into one that anyone can exploit.

What an attacker gets

The advisory and the NVD record (read via the NVD CVE API) describe three kinds of impact:

  • Command execution with the privileges of the FreeSWITCH process, including operating-system commands.
  • Configuration and credential disclosure. A telephony server's config typically holds SIP trunk credentials, user passwords and database connection details.
  • Full call control. An attacker could originate, transfer, monitor or tear down calls.

For a phone system, the third item has direct financial and privacy consequences. Control over call routing on a switch connected to paid trunks is the classic setup for toll fraud. The ability to manipulate or observe calls raises obvious confidentiality concerns for any business that handles sensitive conversations by phone. The sources do not say how the in-the-wild exploitation has been used, who is behind it or how many systems have been hit, and CISA lists known ransomware campaign use as "Unknown."

The CNA score from GitHub, recorded in NVD, is CVSS 3.1 9.8 (Critical), with a vector of network attack, low complexity, no privileges required and no user interaction. NVD lists the record as Analyzed. It was published Nov. 5 and last modified Nov. 10. NVD records the weaknesses as CWE-77 (command injection), CWE-78 (OS command injection) and CWE-749 (exposed dangerous method or function).

The timeline

  • Oct. 28, 2026: FreeSWITCH maintainers publish GHSA-mg63-h38w-8p9p, rated Critical. Versions 1.11.2 and earlier are affected; 1.11.3 is patched.
  • Nov. 5: CVE-2026-116779 is published in NVD.
  • Nov. 9: CISA adds "SignalWire FreeSwitch Code Injection Vulnerability" to KEV with a Nov. 12 due date and flags it for forensic triage. CISA added IBM Aspera Faspex CVE-2026-123218 the same day, also due Nov. 12.
  • Nov. 12: Federal remediation deadline.

CISA's required action is to apply mitigations per vendor instructions under BOD 26-04, or to discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. The KEV entry's "forensic triage: Yes" flag is worth noticing. It signals that patching alone may not be enough and that affected organizations should check whether they were already compromised.

What It Means for Defenders

Who is affected: Anyone running FreeSWITCH 1.11.2 or earlier with SIP chat enabled on any profile, which is the default. That covers self-hosted PBXs and SIP gateways, and likely any commercial product or appliance built on an affected FreeSWITCH release. If you run a VoIP or contact-center product and are not sure what engine it uses, ask your vendor today.

What to do, in order:

  1. Upgrade to FreeSWITCH 1.11.3 or later. This is the fix named in both the advisory and NVD. For vendor products built on FreeSWITCH, get the vendor's patched build and confirm which FreeSWITCH version it includes.
  2. If you cannot patch immediately, disable inbound chat. The advisory's documented workaround is to set enable-chat=false on every SIP profile that does not need inbound chat. Check both the internal and external profiles, since both leave chat on in the stock configuration. The advisory says MESSAGE authentication alone, and disabling the system API alone, do not close the path.
  3. Remove the passwordless default user. If conf/vanilla/directory/default/default.xml, or a copy of the default user it defines, is still present in your directory configuration, remove it. Audit the rest of the directory for users without passwords and for weak or shared credentials, since any single account is enough where MESSAGE authentication is enforced.
  4. Do not rely on the inbound ACL. The advisory says it does not cover MESSAGE. Restrict SIP exposure at the network edge to the carriers and endpoints that actually need to reach the switch.
  5. Assume possible compromise and triage. Because exploitation is confirmed and CISA has flagged the entry for forensic triage, review exposed systems for signs of misuse. Look for unexpected processes spawned by the FreeSWITCH service account, configuration changes, unfamiliar outbound calls or call-volume spikes on your trunks, and unexplained SIP MESSAGE traffic in your logs.
  6. Rotate secrets. If a vulnerable system was reachable, treat everything in its configuration as exposed. That includes SIP trunk and carrier credentials, user and extension passwords, and any database or API credentials. Rotate them after patching, not before, so new secrets are not stolen from an unpatched box.

For federal contractors and CMMC shops: KEV deadlines bind federal civilian agencies directly, but they also serve as a practical benchmark for "timely remediation" of actively exploited flaws. If a FreeSWITCH-based system sits anywhere in your assessment scope, document the patch or the chat-disable mitigation, your review for compromise, and the credential rotation.

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