Business email compromise used to depend on one convincing email. A federal indictment unsealed in Manhattan describes what it looks like when the email is backed by a phone or video call in which the boss's voice and face appear to say the same thing.
On Thursday, Nov. 5, 2026, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) announced charges against three foreign nationals: Jacob Soall, Sharon Hazan and Guy Sheetrit. Prosecutors say that between 2024 and 2026 the men and their co-conspirators used artificial intelligence to imitate the voices and images of chief executives, and also posed as attorneys at major law firms, to get company employees to wire money. According to the government, they took more than $129 million.
These are allegations. An indictment is an accusation, and all three men are presumed innocent unless proven guilty. Lawyers for Sheetrit told CyberScoop that their client "has no connection to this matter."
The alleged playbook: a fake CEO, then a fake lawyer
The DOJ release refers to the technology as "SI," a term its headline spells out as "super intelligence." CyberScoop and The Record both describe it as AI deepfakes. Whatever you call it, the scheme prosecutors describe has two parts.
First, an employee hears from someone who looks or sounds like their CEO, who says they need help with a confidential financial transaction. Then the "CEO" tells the employee to get in touch with lawyers at large international law firms who are supposedly working on the same deal, and the conspirators impersonate those lawyers too. CyberScoop reports the defendants impersonated attorneys at some of the 50 largest law firms. According to the indictment, one of the impersonated lawyers ultimately directs the employee to wire a large sum to an account controlled by the conspiracy. The lawyer persona plausibly helps in two ways: it fits a confidential deal that has to stay quiet, and it gives the employee a second, apparently independent voice confirming the request, which makes saying no harder.
Prosecutors say Soall kept a handwritten script labelled "Lawyer Call," which included language designed to convince victim employees not to discuss their communications with fellow employees. That suggests the impersonation followed a rehearsed routine. Whether a call sounds natural matters less than whether the story holds together, and a script is how you make the story hold together every time.
Once employees sent the wires, the government says, the money went to accounts in the United States, Spain, Portugal, Greece, the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, Austria, Slovakia and China, and was then converted to cryptocurrency. Spreading money across many jurisdictions before moving it on-chain would plausibly narrow the window in which a bank can recall a fraudulent wire.
Who got hit
The release lists six victims by sector and loss. The companies are not named:
- A Missouri hospital system: $4,829,580
- A Rhode Island bank: $2,684,580
- A California hospital system: $2,968,497
- A UK financial technology company: $11,578,474
- A Massachusetts mutual fund company: $4,639,918
- A Florida pet food company: $5,242,747
Those six add up to roughly $31.9 million, about a quarter of the $129 million total prosecutors allege. The rest is not broken down in the public release. The list is also notable for who is on it. A bank and a mutual fund company were fooled, and those are organizations whose daily business includes guarding against payment fraud. Two hospital systems lost a combined total of nearly $7.8 million. CyberScoop puts the targeting window at July 2024 through February 2026.
The defendants and the arrests
According to the government and CyberScoop's reporting:
- Jacob Soall, 41, of Marbella, Spain, was arrested in Spain on June 17. He is the defendant alleged to have kept the "Lawyer Call" script.
- Sharon Hazan, 54, of Israel, was arrested in Spain on Aug. 5. Prosecutors say he laundered proceeds and boasted of laundering more than $400 million in three years. The DOJ release says he was previously convicted in SDNY of conspiracy to commit bank fraud in 2008.
- Guy Sheetrit, 42, of Israel and the UAE, was arrested in the United Kingdom on Sept. 7. He is also alleged to have laundered funds. His attorneys, Sharon Nahari and Shay Shorer, told CyberScoop he has no connection to the case.
The indictment contains seven counts carrying a combined maximum of 104 years in prison. Statutory maximums are a ceiling, not a prediction of any sentence. The United States has requested extradition of all three men, and those requests are pending. U.S. Attorney Jamie McDonald and FBI Assistant Director in Charge James C. Barnacle Jr. both commented in the release. The release asks anyone who believes they may be a victim to use the FBI's online tips page.
Why this case matters beyond the dollar figure
Deepfake-assisted payment fraud has been discussed for years, mostly through vendor warnings and the occasional overseas news story. This case puts a U.S. federal prosecution, named defendants and a specific victim list behind it. If the allegations hold up, the money moved at the same point BEC always targets: an employee who can send a wire and who believes the person asking for it.
The law-firm angle should get as much attention as the synthetic voices. Plenty of finance teams already know to be suspicious of an unexpected request from the CEO. Far fewer are trained to question a call that includes "outside counsel," especially counsel from a well-known firm the company may actually work with. Pairing the two is a way to get past exactly that training.
What It Means for Defenders
No patch or software version is involved here. The attack, as prosecutors describe it, goes after people and payment processes, so the fixes are about process. The sources do not include a vendor advisory or a list of technical mitigations. The steps below are general defensive practice that fits the scheme described.
- Who should pay attention: anyone who can start, approve or release outgoing wires, plus executive assistants, treasury and accounts-payable staff, and in-house legal teams. The victim list covers healthcare, banking, fintech, asset management and consumer goods, so no sector should assume it is too small or too specialized to be targeted.
- Treat voice and video as unauthenticated. A familiar face on a video call or a familiar voice on the phone no longer proves who someone is. Authorization for a payment should never rest on a call alone, however convincing it is.
- Verify out of band, using contact details you already had. Before money moves, confirm the request through a channel you set up yourself: a number from the internal directory or an existing contract file, never one given during the call or in the email. Do the same for anyone claiming to be outside counsel. Call the firm's main line and ask for the attorney by name.
- Require two people for large or unusual wires. Have a second approver, who was not on the original call, sign off on any wire over a set amount, any payment to a new or changed beneficiary, and any payment to an overseas account. Secrecy and urgency should trigger extra checks, not skip them.
- Make it safe to say no. Tell staff in writing that leadership will back them for delaying a payment to verify it, even if the request appears to come from the CEO. Social engineering works by making a refusal feel like insubordination.
- Agree on internal verification phrases or callback procedures for executives and finance staff to use for high-value requests, and change them regularly.
- Have a recall plan ready. If a fraudulent wire goes out, speed matters, because prosecutors say these funds were converted to cryptocurrency. Know in advance who calls your bank to ask for a recall and how to reach law enforcement.
- If you think you were targeted, the DOJ release asks possible victims in this case to use the FBI's online tips page at tips.fbi.gov.
For organizations working through CMMC or other compliance programs, add this scenario to awareness training and tabletop exercises. Include the "lawyer call" stage specifically, because most phishing simulations stop at the email.
Sources
- U.S. Attorney's Office, SDNY: Three Foreign Nationals Arrested And Charged With Scheme To Use Super Intelligence To Defraud Companies Of $129 Million (via mirror)
- CyberScoop: Authorities accuse trio of using AI deepfakes to defraud $129M from businesses
- The Record: CEO-spoofing scammers used AI to help steal more than $100 million, feds say