In the attacks Ukrainian police describe, the break-in began with a call or voice message. A caller posing as the company's IT support asked an employee to hand over login details or to install a remote-access tool. According to Ukraine's National Police, the group built its own platform with AI-generated voice messages. Investigators say at least 28 companies later paid more than $40.5 million in ransom.

On 18 November 2026, the National Police of Ukraine said it had worked with the FBI to break up what it calls an international extortion organization. Officers carried out 66 simultaneous searches in Kyiv and 11 other regions. Four people police describe as key members have been formally notified of suspicion and are in custody. The police say the joint investigation with the FBI ran for more than two years.

What the Police Say They Found

Acting National Police head Maksym Tsutskiridze laid out the case in an interview with Censor.NET, republished on the police website. Key points:

  • Size of the organization: at least 27 people from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia.
  • Wider network: more than 60 people across eight jurisdictions. Police say this network includes former members of Conti, the ransomware operation.
  • Money: at least 28 companies paid a combined $40.5 million or more, about UAH 1.8 billion.
  • Seized in the raids: computers, phones, bank cards, nearly $370,000 in cash and EUR 20,000.
  • Charges: the four suspects face charges under Article 255, part 2, and Article 361, part 5, of Ukraine's Criminal Code. The maximum sentence is 15 years in prison.

The police account gave one victim as an example without naming it. It was a US company that lost 1.4 TB of data. The attackers demanded $10 million, and the company paid $5 million.

"A Call From IT Support"

This was not mainly a story about software exploits. Police say the group used vishing (voice phishing), backed by AI-generated voice messages. The callers posed as a target company's IT support staff. Their goal was either to get the employee's login credentials or to get the employee to install remote-access software. Once that software is running, an outsider can control the computer as if sitting at the keyboard.

BleepingComputer adds more detail on the group's methods. It reports that the attackers used phishing pages that copied corporate VPN login portals, called from spoofed phone numbers, and relied on legitimate remote-support tools such as TeamViewer and AnyDesk. These tools are common in real IT departments, so a request to install one does not look strange. That is why the approach works.

The AI voice part matters because it removes a weakness in older help-desk scams. A live caller with the wrong accent, nervous delivery or poor command of company jargon could give themselves away. A pre-generated voice message can be polished in advance and reused on many targets.

Who Was Hit: What the Court Records Say

The police account does not name victims. French outlet LeMagIT reviewed Ukrainian court records, and BleepingComputer reported on them. Those records name several US companies. These are allegations in court filings, not findings announced by police:

  • Warren Oil Company: attacked in August 2024. The records cite 1.4 TB of stolen data and a payment of 84.5 BTC, about $5 million. The 1.4 TB and roughly $5 million figures resemble the unnamed US victim in the police account, but neither source says outright that they are the same company.
  • Maxxis International-USA: named as a victim. The reporting gives no payment amount.
  • Newpark Resources: allegedly paid $1.5 million in December 2024.
  • Quantum Health: allegedly paid $5 million in June 2026 after an initial demand of $15 million.

BleepingComputer reports that the court records identify the ransomware used as Chaos.

The Conti Question

The headline link is to Conti, a ransomware gang that shut down in May 2022 and whose members dispersed to other groups. That link needs care. Police say the wider network includes former Conti members. The police statement quoted in the sources says only that the wider network includes former Conti members, and BleepingComputer reports that authorities have not identified the four arrested suspects as former Conti members (LeMagIT's own headline and summary are looser on this point). BleepingComputer notes that authorities have not confirmed whether the four are tied to Conti, BlackSuit or Chaos as affiliates.

LeMagIT editor Valery Riess-Marchive points out that the fake-IT-support approach resembles BazarCall. That was a sub-group specialized in initial access that worked for teams linked to Conti. LeMagIT says it supplied access to teams linked to Conti, including the one that led to Quantum, then Royal and BlackSuit, and the one behind Black Basta. This comparison is LeMagIT's own analysis. Police have not confirmed it.

In short, police say the group is part of a network that includes former Conti members, and the court records name Chaos as the ransomware. The ties between the people arrested and any particular brand are still unproven.

What It Means for Defenders

No CVE or patch is involved here. The way in was a phone call followed by a login or a software install. The sources describe phone-based social engineering, fake VPN portals and legitimate remote-access tools. Organizations of any size can be targeted this way, including small businesses with a part-time or outsourced IT provider and defense contractors whose help-desk procedures fall under CMMC. Practical steps:

  • Set up a callback rule for IT requests. If someone claiming to be IT asks an employee to log in, reset a password or install software, the employee should hang up and call back on a number from the company directory. Never use the number that called or one left in a voicemail. Caller ID can be spoofed, and police say this group used AI-generated voice messages.
  • Control remote-access tools. TeamViewer and AnyDesk appear in the reporting on this case. Allow only the remote-support product your IT team actually uses, and block or alert on installs of any other. Watch for new installs of approved tools on machines where nobody asked for support.
  • Make fake VPN pages harder to use. Teach staff the exact address of the real VPN portal. Where possible, use phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication such as FIDO2 security keys or passkeys, so a password typed into a copied login page cannot be used alone.
  • Change credentials after any suspicious call. If an employee shared a password or installed something during an "IT support" call, treat it as a confirmed compromise. Reset the account, end its active sessions, remove the tool and check the endpoint.
  • Watch for large data transfers. The one US victim police described lost 1.4 TB before it was extorted. Monitoring for unusually large outbound transfers can catch theft before an extortion demand arrives.
  • Brief your help desk and employees. Make sure staff know that real IT will never ask for a password over the phone. Run a vishing exercise based on this pattern.

For companies named in the court records, or any company that dealt with a suspicious "IT support" call in the period described, the case is a reason to check old remote-access logs and earlier incident reports again.

Sources