For several hours on November 16, visitors to some of the best-known websites on the internet loaded malware without any of those sites changing a line of their own code. The malicious JavaScript came through Optimizely Web Experimentation, a widely used A/B testing service. An attacker exploited a vulnerability in the platform and wrote code into customers' project scripts. Optimizely's own content delivery network then served that code to everyone who visited the affected sites.

Security researcher Scott Helme of Report URI, who published the first detailed account, counted 178 affected organizations. They include Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC and Equifax. The injected kit swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed payment card data, stole cookies and screenshots, and on older iPhones and iPads it tried to load two iOS exploit kits, Coruna and DarkSword.

Third-party script compromises are not new. What makes this one stand out is how many large companies it reached at once, how fast the attacker kept changing the payload, and how few victims had browser-side controls that stopped it.

How the attack worked

A/B testing tools let marketing and product teams try out changes to a site, such as a new headline or a different button color, without a full deployment. To do that, the site loads a small script, or "snippet", from the vendor. The snippet carries whatever custom code the customer has configured in the vendor's dashboard, which Optimizely calls the Project JavaScript. Because that code runs inside the customer's page, it can see and change anything a visitor sees or types.

According to Report URI, the attacker did not need to break into any of the 178 organizations. They wrote malicious code directly into customer Project JavaScript inside Optimizely, and the poisoned snippets kept being served from the legitimate cdn.optimizely.com domain with Optimizely's own certificate. To a browser, and to many security tools, that looked like ordinary, trusted traffic. Report URI says it does not know how the attacker gained write access to so many unrelated customer projects and called that "for Optimizely to explain."

Optimizely confirmed the core of this account. In a statement quoted by Krebs on Security, the company said that on November 16, 2026 it "identified a security incident in which an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in the Optimizely Experimentation to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects."

The Hacker News reported that the loader came in three variants and pulled its next stage from 1688360[.]cc/track.js (the domain is "defanged" with brackets so it can't be clicked by accident). One variant hid the address in base64 so a plain text search for the domain would miss it, and another carried a full copy of the payload that runs if the domain is blocked. Krebs reported that the attacker rebuilt the payload 26 times over the course of the day. Krebs framed it as the attacker using the A/B testing platform to A/B test malware.

What the kit did to visitors

Report URI describes the payload as a multi-purpose kit rather than a single-purpose skimmer. Its functions included:

  • Crypto address swapping: replacing wallet addresses on the page so payments went to the attacker instead.
  • Card skimming: capturing card number, expiry date and CVV submitted through a site's own form fields. Report URI says cards entered in hosted payment iframes, such as Stripe or Adyen, were out of its reach.
  • Cookie and screenshot theft: sending the visitor's cookies, which can let an attacker take over a logged-in session, and a screenshot of the page. Cookies marked HttpOnly could not be read.
  • iOS exploit delivery: loading the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits on older iPhones and iPads. Krebs describes both as kits that chain together a half-dozen security holes to take control of outdated devices.

Report URI counted about $7,040 in cryptocurrency received by the attacker's wallets as of 19:25 UTC on November 16, all within roughly nine hours. Krebs, citing Report URI's estimates, put the theft at around $7,500. The number of card records taken is unknown. On the iOS side, The Hacker News reported that no iPhones have been reported actually taken over. Being served an exploit kit and being successfully compromised by it are not the same thing, and so far no compromised devices have been reported.

A cleanup that took more than one try

Report URI tracked the infection as it shrank. At 20:56 UTC on November 16 it found 169 infected snippets. By 21:52 UTC only one remained, out of 188 infected snippets seen in total (belonging to the 178 organizations).

The cleanup did not go smoothly everywhere. The Hacker News reported that Smartsheet's script was cleaned and then infected again, which suggests the attacker still had access at that point. Optimizely posted an incident notice at 01:02 UTC. The Hacker News noted that it did not explain how the vulnerability worked, how many projects were changed, or what customers should do.

The fuller statement quoted by Krebs lists the company's response: blocking the vulnerable path, deploying a fix, removing the injected code, ending active sessions, revoking tokens, resetting access for affected user accounts, and adding protections in Cloudflare. Optimizely said third-party experts are investigating. It has not publicly named the attacker, and none of the sources attribute the attack to a specific group.

Why so few sites were protected

The browser already has a control built for this situation, the Content Security Policy (CSP). A CSP is a response header in which a site lists which domains its pages may load scripts from and send data to. If a hijacked script tries to fetch a payload from an unknown domain, or send stolen data to one, a CSP in enforcement mode tells the browser to block it.

Krebs reported Report URI's breakdown of how the affected sites fared. Report URI crawled 256 hosts belonging to affected organizations and its results table covers 159 of them. Sixty-eight had no CSP at all. Fifty had a CSP that still allowed the payload and the data theft. Seventeen let the payload run but blocked the data theft through a connect-src rule, so address swapping still worked. Only 24, about 15 percent, had a policy that fully blocked it. Report URI says what separated those 24 was a restrictive script-src that listed only the hosts the site needs. Allowing cdn.optimizely.com could not help, because the malicious code arrived from that trusted host itself, and settings such as strict-dynamic and unsafe-eval let the payload through on some sites.

Part of the reason is scale. Krebs cited the 2025 Web Almanac, which found that the median homepage loads at least 22 JavaScript files. Each one runs with the same access to the page as the site's own code. Krebs quoted Infoblox researcher Zach Edwards saying most websites apart from the largest e-commerce, social media and financial platforms do not bother with CSPs, or leave them overly permissive for marketing reasons.

One caveat: Report URI sells CSP reporting and script monitoring products, so its recommendations match its own business. Its incident data is still the most detailed public account so far, and Krebs and The Hacker News both relied on it.

What It Means for Defenders

Who is affected. Any organization using Optimizely Web Experimentation should check whether its Project JavaScript was changed on November 16, and should not wait for an individual notice. Optimizely has not published a list of affected projects. Report URI's list of 178 organizations includes the names above, but it covers only the snippets one researcher could find in time, and Report URI says the real number is likely higher.

What to check now:

  • Review your Project JavaScript. Report URI advises opening the Project JavaScript in every project and the custom code in every experiment, looking for 1688360, atob( or any script you did not write. Given the Smartsheet re-infection, check more than once.
  • Search your logs for the loader domain. Look in proxy, DNS and CSP violation reports for requests to 1688360[.]cc. StepSecurity, cited by The Hacker News, suggests searching logs back to 08:00 UTC on November 16.
  • Rotate Optimizely credentials. Optimizely says it ended sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts. Report URI also advises reviewing which users, API tokens and integrations can write to your account and rotating their credentials.
  • Treat visitor data as potentially exposed. If your own forms took card details on November 16, treat those cards as possibly exposed and involve your payment processor and incident response team. Report URI advises treating session tokens or other secrets kept in cookies without the HttpOnly flag as exposed and rotating them.
  • Older Apple devices. Report URI advises anyone who visited an affected site that day to update iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, which the kit's own comments mark as patched. Devices that cannot update should be retired.

Longer-term mitigations. Report URI's main recommendation is a Content Security Policy with a strict script-src and connect-src, in enforcement mode, scoped tightly enough that a trusted vendor's script can't pull code from, or send data to, an unknown domain. Its products also monitor third-party scripts for unexpected changes and new destinations, and it says such signals would have exposed this attack. Keeping third-party tags off checkout pages is another measure advised in the sources.

The broader point is that any script you load from a vendor runs with the same access as your own code. A widely trusted vendor with poor security can put your visitors at risk without anything on your servers being touched.

Sources